

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

James E. McNeil,)	C/A No. 0:07-0708-TLW-BM
)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
vs.)	Report and Recommendation
)	
Archie Rouse, Jr.;)	
City of Darlington, S.C.;)	
County of Darlington, S.C.; and)	
State of South Carolina,)	
)	
)	
Defendants.)	

The plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee at the Darlington County Detention Center in Darlington, South Carolina. The “lead” defendant is a private citizen who has accused the plaintiff of armed robbery. The plaintiff has also brought suit against the City of Darlington, Darlington County, and the State of South Carolina.

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* petition pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 118 L.Ed.2d 340, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1992 U.S. LEXIS® 2689 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-325, 104 L.Ed.2d 338, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1989 U.S. LEXIS® 2231 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction*, 64 F.3d 951, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS® 26108 (4th Cir. 1995)(*en banc*), *cert. denied*, 516 U.S. 1177,



134 L.Ed.2d 219, 116 S.Ct. 1273, 1996 U.S. LEXIS® 1844 (1996); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979)(recognizing the district court's authority to conduct an initial screening of any *pro se* filing);¹ *Loe v. Armistead*, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978), *cert. denied*, *Moffitt v. Loe*, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); and *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, *Leeke v. Gordon*, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).

As the plaintiff is a *pro se* litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 & n. 7 (1980)(*per curiam*); *Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); *Fine v. City of New York*, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). However, even under this less stringent standard, the complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Department of Social Services*, 901 F.2d 387, 1990 U.S.App. LEXIS® 6120 (4th Cir. 1990).

Discussion

In the above-captioned case, the plaintiff is challenging his pending criminal proceedings, wherein he has been charged with armed robbery. Plaintiff contends that he did not commit the crime for which he has been charged. In his prayer for relief, plaintiff seeks an investigation of the “Darlington County Police department,” the plaintiff’s release from confinement, an investigation of Mr. Rouse, and an order directing that the plaintiff’s name be cleared by the newspaper. The plaintiff also appears to be seeking damages for emotional stress.

¹*Boyce* has been held by some authorities to have been abrogated in part, on other grounds, by *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)(insofar as *Neitzke* establishes that a complaint that fails to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), does not by definition merit *sua sponte* dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)], as “frivolous”).



Although the holding in *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 129 L.Ed.2d 383, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 1994 U.S. LEXIS® 4824 (1994), is not applicable to the above-captioned case, *see Wallace v. Kato*, 166 L.Ed.2d 973, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 2007 U.S. LEXIS® 2650 (2007), the above-captioned case is still subject to summary dismissal. Absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings. *See, e.g., Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); *Harkrader v. Wadley*, 172 U.S. 148, 169-170 (1898); *Taylor v. Taintor*, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 370 & n. 8 (1873);² *Nivens v. Gilchrist*, 319 F.3d 151, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS® 2453 (4th Cir. 2003); and *Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist*, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied*, 494 U.S. 1030, 108 L.Ed.2d 616, 110 S.Ct. 1479, 1990 U.S. LEXIS® 1399 (1990). In *Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that federal district courts should abstain from constitutional challenges to state judicial proceedings, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. *Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, supra*, 887 F.2d at 52. Moreover, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, expressly prohibits this court from enjoining such proceedings. *See also Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis*, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975)(*en banc*), *cert. denied*, 424 U.S. 946 (1976).

In *Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit pointed out that federal constitutional claims are cognizable in both state courts and

²Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not overruled *Taylor v. Taintor*, an unrelated portion of the decision in *Taylor v. Taintor*, which concerned the right of sureties to apprehend principals, has been superannuated by statute in Texas. *See Green v. State*, 829 S.W.2d 222, 223, 1992 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS® 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)(“However, *Taylor* is not the law in Texas.”), *affirming Green v. State*, 785 S.W.2d 955, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS® 806 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1990).



in federal courts: "Congress and the federal courts have consistently recognized that federal courts should permit state courts to try state cases, and that, where constitutional issues arise, state court judges are fully competent to handle them subject to Supreme Court review." The *pro se* plaintiff also does not meet the tests for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order enunciated in such cases as *North Carolina State Ports Authority v. Dart Containerline Company*, 592 F.2d 749, 750-753 & n. 3 (4th Cir. 1979).

In any event, it is clear that the plaintiff has not exhausted his state remedies. If the plaintiff is later convicted and sentenced in his pending criminal case, he has the remedy of filing a direct appeal. *State v. Northcutt*, ___ S.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2007 S.C. LEXIS® 64, 2006 WESTLAW® 4069418 (S.C., February 20, 2007).³ If his direct appeal is unsuccessful, the plaintiff can file an application for post-conviction relief. *See* § 17-27-10, *et seq.*, South Carolina Code of Laws. Moreover, if a South Carolina prisoner's application for post-conviction relief is denied or dismissed by a Court of Common Pleas, he or she can file an appeal in that post-conviction case. *See* § 17-27-100, South Carolina Code of Laws; and *Knight v. State*, 284 S.C. 138, 325 S.E.2d 535, 1985 S.C. LEXIS® 312 (1985). In fact, South Carolina prisoners have been successful on such appeals in their post-conviction cases. *See, e.g., Custodio v. State*, ___ S.C. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, Opinion No. 26296 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, March 26, 2007)(on issue of enforcement of plea agreement); *Morris v. State*, 371 S.C. 278, 639 S.E.2d 53, 2006 S.C. LEXIS® 392 (2006)(on issue of ineffective assistance of counsel); *Riddle v. Ozmint*, 369 S.C. 39, 631 S.E.2d 70, 2006 S.C.

³It is not clear why the WESTLAW® service has given *Northcutt*, which was decided in 2007, a 2006 WESTLAW® citation.

LEXIS® 177 (2006); *Stevens v. State*, 365 S.C. 309, 617 S.E.2d 366, 2005 S.C. LEXIS® 221(2005); and *Vaughn v. State*, 362 S.C. 163, 607 S.E.2d 72, 73-76, 2004 S.C. LEXIS® 296 (2004).

It is well settled that a direct appeal is a viable state court remedy. *Castille v. Peoples*, 489 U.S. 346, 349-352, 103 L.Ed.2d 380, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1989 U.S. LEXIS® 1040 (1989). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that South Carolina's Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is also a viable state-court remedy. *See Miller v. Harvey*, 566 F.2d 879, 880-881 (4th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 439 U.S. 838 (1978); and *Patterson v. Leeke*, 556 F.2d 1168, 1170-1173 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 929 (1977). In an application for post-conviction relief, the plaintiff can raise issues relating to ineffective assistance of counsel. *See Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); and *Brightman v. State*, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614, 1999 S.C. LEXIS® 164 (1999).

Further, this federal district court cannot order dismissal of the plaintiff's criminal charge or order his release from confinement as part of the above-captioned civil rights action. "Release from prison is not a remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." *Myers v. Pauling*, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 7628, 1995 WESTLAW® 334284 (E.D.Pa., June 2, 1995). *See also Edwards v. Balisok*, 520 U.S. 641, 137 L.Ed.2d 906, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1997 U.S. LEXIS® 3075 (1997). Also, Mr. Rouse cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his testimony or statements in the plaintiff's criminal case because it is well settled that a witness in a state court does not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional requirement for a § 1983 suit. *Burke v. Miller*, 580 F.2d 108, 109-110 & n. 3 (4th Cir. 1978), *cert. denied*, 440 U.S. 930 (1979). Also, all persons who have testified in any judicial proceedings relating to the plaintiff's pending criminal case have absolute immunity in an action for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See Briscoe v. LaHue*, 460 U.S. 325, 327-



346 (1983); and *Lowman v. Town of Concord*, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 3041, 1995 WESTLAW® 108224 (W.D.N.Y., March 7, 1995)(collecting cases). *See also Kincaid v. Eberle*, 712 F.2d 1023 (7th Cir.)(police officer who testifies before a grand jury has absolute immunity), *cert. denied*, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983). Moreover, the calling of law enforcement by Mr. Rouse is not action under color of state law, because "a private person does not act under color of state law simply because he invokes state authority." *Brummett v. Camble*, 946 F.2d 1178, 1184, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS® 26889 (5th Cir. 1991), *cert. denied*, *Campbell v. Brummett*, 504 U.S. 965, 119 L.Ed.2d 241, 112 S.Ct. 2323, 1992 U.S. LEXIS® 3384 (1992).⁴

As for the State of South Carolina, this Defendant is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, which divests this court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts, such as a state agency or department. *See, e.g., Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority*, 535 U.S. 743, 152 L.Ed.2d 962, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 2002 U.S. LEXIS® 3794 (2002); *Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett*, 531 U.S. 356, 148 L.Ed.2d 866, 121 S.Ct. 955, 2001 U.S. LEXIS® 1700 (2001); *Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents*, 528 U.S. 62, 145 L.Ed.2d 522, 120 S.Ct. 631, 2000 U.S. LEXIS® 498 (2000)(Congress exceeded its authority in making Age Discrimination in Employment Act [ADEA] applicable to States); *Alden v. Maine*, 527 U.S. 706, 4601, 144 L.Ed.2d 636, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 1999 U.S. LEXIS® 4374 (1999); *Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)(although express language of Eleventh Amendment only forbids suits by citizens of other States against a State, Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State filed by its own citizens); *Belcher v. South Carolina Board of Corrections*, 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-809 (D.S.C. 1978); and

⁴In this citation, there are variant spellings of the party known as Camble or Campbell.



Simmons v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 195 F. Supp. 516, 517 (E.D.S.C. 1961).

Under *Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, supra*, 465 U.S. at 99 & n. 9, a State must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. *Higgins v. Mississippi*, 217 F.3d 951, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS® 15330 (7th Cir. 2000) (“A state may, it is plain, waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity from being sued in federal court either legislatively, . . . or by an explicit waiver in the lawsuit in which it is named as a defendant, . . . provided that the waiver is authorized by state law.”). The State of South Carolina has not, however, consented to suit in a federal court. See a provision in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, § 15-78-20(e), South Carolina Code of Laws, which expressly states that the State of South Carolina does *not* waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another State. Cf. *Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, supra*, 465 U.S. at 121 (“[N]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment.”).

Darlington County and the City of Darlington are also entitled to summary dismissal. Darlington County and the City of Darlington do not hire or supervise the Fourth Circuit Solicitor, who “hires and fires” Assistant Solicitors. *Anders v. County Council for Richland County*, 284 S.C. 142, 325 S.E.2d 538, 1985 S.C. LEXIS® 313 (1985).⁵ Similarly, Darlington County and the City of Darlington are also not responsible for actions taken by any state courts within Darlington County or in the City of Darlington. It can be judicially noticed that, in South Carolina, a county's authority over courts within its boundaries was abolished when Article V of the Constitution of the State of

⁵In South Carolina, regional prosecutors are called Solicitors and Assistant Solicitors. See § 24 of Article V, Constitution of the State of South Carolina; and § 1-7-310, South Carolina Code of Laws. Solicitors are elected by voters of a judicial circuit.



South Carolina was ratified in 1973. See Act No. 58, 1973 S.C. Acts 161; Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina; and *State ex rel. McLeod v. Civil and Criminal Court of Horry County*, 265 S.C. 114, 217 S.E.2d 23, 24 (1975).⁶

Under the current version of Article V, Section 1, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, not Darlington County or the City of Darlington, retains the *sole* authority to supervise magistrates' courts, municipal courts, Family Courts, Probate Courts, and Courts of General Sessions in Darlington County or in the City of Darlington. *See Spartanburg County Dept. of Social Services v. Padgett*, 296 S.C. 79, 370 S.E.2d 872, 875-876 & n. 1, 1988 S.C. LEXIS® 82 (1988). By virtue of Article V, a County or municipality does not exercise administrative or supervisory authority over municipal courts, magistrates' courts, or courts of the State of South Carolina located within the geographical boundaries of the particular County or municipality.

Additionally, the doctrine of *respondeat superior* is not applicable in § 1983 actions. *Vinnedge v. Gibbs*, 550 F.2d 926, 928-29 (4th Cir. 1977). Hence, the City of Darlington and Darlington County cannot be held liable for the actions of the arresting officers. With respect to the police officers who arrested the plaintiff, the absence of any allegations about the City of Darlington and Darlington County also forecloses any application of the limited “policy or custom” exception to the prohibition against application of the doctrines of *respondeat superior* or vicarious liability in § 1983 cases. *See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)(municipalities are liable under § 1983 only for violations of federal law that occur pursuant

⁶County courts in the State of South Carolina no longer exist. Section 22 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina (1973) allowed "any existing court" on the date of ratification to continue operating until Article V was fully implemented. *See State ex rel. McLeod v. Civil and Criminal Court of Horry County*, 217 S.E.2d at 24 ("The Horry County Court is one of the courts continued in existence solely by virtue of the provisions of Section 22 of Article V.").

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to official governmental policy or custom). While there is a limited exception to the prohibition against imposing liability in § 1983 cases under the doctrines of *respondeat superior* or vicarious liability, which has been enunciated in cases such as *Slakan v. Porter*, 737 F.2d 368, 370-375 (4th Cir. 1984), *cert. denied*, *Reed v. Slakan*, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985); *See also Shaw v. Stroud*, 13 F.3d 791, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS® 196 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, *Stroud v. Shaw*, 513 U.S. 813, 130 L.Ed.2d 24, 115 S.Ct. 67, 1994 U.S. LEXIS® 5500 (1994); those cases are obviously not on point in the above-captioned case.

As for Plaintiff's request for damages for emotional stress, there is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, psychological stress, or mental anguish, and, hence, there is no liability under Section 1983 regarding such claims. *See Grandstaff v. City of Borger*, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), *rehearing denied*, 779 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1986), *cert. denied*, *City of Borger v. Grandstaff*, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); and *Rodriguez v. Comas*, 888 F.2d 899, 903, 1989 U.S.App. LEXIS® 15698 (1st Cir. 1989). *See also* the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which provides that physical injuries are a prerequisite for an award of damages for emotional distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This provision is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), and has been held to be constitutional. *See Zehner v. Trigg*, 952 F. Supp. 1318, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 369 (S.D.Ind. 1997), *affirmed*, 133 F.3d 459, 463, 1997 U.S.App. LEXIS® 36776 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The restriction § 1997e(e) places on prisoners, therefore, is not even exclusive to them; [*Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley*, 521 U.S. 424, 1997 U.S. LEXIS® 3867 (1997) (Federal Employers' Liability precludes recovery for emotional damages from exposure to asbestos in the absence of symptoms of asbestos-related disease)] authoritatively interprets an Act of Congress to impose the same



restriction upon a large group of non-prisoners. This application to another group severely undercuts plaintiffs' argument that § 1997e(e) denies them equal protection.”).

Plaintiff also cannot obtain relief for slander or libel in this civil rights action because an alleged act of defamation of character or injury to reputation is not actionable under § 1983. *Paul v. Davis*, 424 U.S. 693, 697-710 & nn. 3-4 (1976). Secondly, under longstanding South Carolina case law, contents of governmental records – such as judicial proceedings, case reports, published cases, investigative reports, or arrest records – do not give rise to liability for slander or libel. *See Heyward v. Cuthbert*, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 354, 356-359 (1827); and *Padgett v. Sun News*, 278 S.C. 26, 292 S.E.2d 30, 32-33, 1982 S.C. LEXIS® 335 (1982). *See also* case law interpreting the "fair report" doctrine (press may publish a "fair report" on official government proceedings such as arrest records, court records, or transcripts, even if the contents of those governmental records are defamatory), such as, *e.g.*, *Medico v. Time, Inc.*, 643 F.2d 134, 137-140 (3rd Cir.), *cert. denied*, 454 U.S. 836 (1981), where the Court held that a news magazine was privileged to publish a summary of FBI documents identifying the appellant as a member of an organized crime group; *Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn*, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)(prohibiting invasion of privacy action for publication of public record – name of deceased rape victim); and *Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo*, 849 F.2d 876, 878-880 & nn. 1-2, 1988 U.S.App. LEXIS® 8343 (4th Cir. 1988), *cert. denied*, *Dong-A Ilbo v. Lee*, 489 U.S. 1067, 103 L.Ed.2d 812, 109 S.Ct. 1343, 1989 U.S. LEXIS® 1288 (1989). Furthermore, civil rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, do not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under a state's tort law. *DeShaney v. Winnebago County*

Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 200-203, 103 L.Ed.2d 249, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1989 U.S. LEXIS® 1039 (1989).⁷

On page 5 of the complaint, the plaintiff seeks a federal investigation of the defendants. However, plaintiff cannot obtain a criminal investigation of the defendants through a

⁷This federal court cannot compel the local newspaper to "clear" the plaintiff's name. *See Miami Herald Publishing Co., Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo*, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)(newspaper may refuse to publish a political reply advertisement, even when state law gives right to reply). In *Tornillo*, the Supreme Court rejected an "access" theory, which was embodied in Florida's statutory law:

Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced. * * * Government-enforced right of access inescapably "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate[.]"

* * *

Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. * * * The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials -- whether fair or unfair -- constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed.

Miami Herald Publishing Co., Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257-258 (footnotes and citations omitted). *See also Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California*, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), where the Supreme Court reaffirmed its opinion in *Tornillo*: "For corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say." *Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California*, 475 U.S. at 16, quoting *Miami Herald Publishing Co., Division of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo*, 418 U.S. at 258.



federal civil rights action. *See Linda R.S. v. Richard D.*, 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)(a private citizen does not have a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another person); *Diamond v. Charles*, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65 (1986)(*applying Linda R.S. v. Richard D.* and collecting cases); *Doyle v. Oklahoma State Bar Ass'n*, 998 F.2d 1559, 1566-1567, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS® 18064 (10th Cir. 1993); *Lane v. Correll*, 434 F.2d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 1970); *Nader v. Saxbe*, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 89, 497 F.2d 676, 679 nn. 18-19, 681 n. 27 (D.C.Cir. 1974)(n. 27: "Thus her [Linda R. S.'s] complaint in effect sought a judicial order compelling prosecution of a particular individual, a practice shunned by American courts."); and *United States v. Passman*, 465 F. Supp. 736, 741 & n. 13 (W.D.La. 1979)(“the defendant lacks standing to challenge the failure of the government to instigate criminal proceedings against another person.”). *See also Collins v. Palczewski*, 841 F. Supp. 333, 340, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 18960 (D.Nev. 1993)(“Long ago the courts of these United States established that 'criminal statutes cannot be enforced by civil actions.'”). *Cf. Neitzke v. Williams, supra* (although district courts should not blur the distinction between the standards applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because a claim is frivolous, a patently insubstantial complaint may be dismissed); and *Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce*, 252 U.S.App.D.C. 37, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201-1202, 1986 U.S.App. LEXIS® 23496 (D.C.Cir. 1986)(denying motion to disqualify Office of the United States Attorney). Furthermore, since the plaintiff does not have a judicially cognizable interest in the criminal prosecution of another person, the plaintiff lacks standing to even raise such a claim. *Linda R.S. v. Richard D.*, *supra*, 410 U.S. at 619. *See also, Leeeke v. Timmerman*, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981). Therefore, since the plaintiff does



not have standing to seek a federal criminal investigation or federal criminal charges, such relief requested by the plaintiff cannot be granted in the above-captioned case.

Recommendation

Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the above-captioned case *without prejudice* and without issuance and service of process. *See Denton v. Hernandez, supra; Neitzke v. Williams, supra; Haines v. Kerner, supra; Brown v. Briscoe*, 998 F.2d 201, 202-204 & n. *, 1993 U.S.App.LEXIS® 17715 (4th Cir. 1993), *replacing* unpublished opinion originally tabled at 993 F.2d 1535 (4th Cir. 1993); *Boyce v. Alizaduh, supra; Todd v. Baskerville, supra*, 712 F.2d at 74; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)[essentially a redesignation of "old" 1915(d)]; and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A[as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal].

The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important Notice on the next page.

Respectfully submitted,



April 3, 2007
Columbia, South Carolina

Bristow Marchant
United States Magistrate Judge



Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The plaintiff is advised that he may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court judge need not conduct a *de novo* review, but instead must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005).

Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) & (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

**Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201**

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in the waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, *Schronce v. United States*, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).

